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Sovereign Immunity Restricted to Noncommercial 
Activity-Victory Transport Inc. v. Comisaria 
General de Abastecimientos y Transportes* 
[Vol. 63 
Although frequently criticized,1 the established doctrine of 
absolute sovereign immunity has long prevented suits in the courts 
of the United States against foreign nations without their consent.2 
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, however, in Victory 
Transport Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abastecimientos y Trans-
portes,3 recently approved a theory of restrictive sovereign immunity 
limiting a foreign nation's immunity from suit to acts of a non-
commercial nature. This action affirmed a district court order 
compelling arbitration between an American shipowner and the 
Spanish Ministry of Commerce in accordance with the terms of a 
contract to carry wheat from Alabama to Spain.4 Although the 
Spanish Consul asserted that the Ministry, as a branch of the Spanish 
government, was immune from suit in American courts, the court 
classified the transaction as commercial and permitted the suit. 
Although Victory Transport represents the first formulation of 
the theory of restrictive sovereign immunity at the federal appellate 
level,5 the doctrine of "absolute immunity" has been limited in 
previous cases. In Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman,6 the United States 
Supreme Court held that immunity did not extend to a ship con-
trolled and operated by a private Mexican corporation, even though 
owned by the Mexican government.7 A more far-reaching limitation 
to the doctrine of absolute immunity, however, was indicated by the 
Court in Hoffman when it declared that the judiciary should defer to 
the position taken in each instance by the State Department.8 There-
after, the State Department announced, in the Tate Letter,0 its de-
" 336 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1964). 
1. E.g., Flota Maritima Browning de Cuba v. Motor Vessel Ciudad, 335 F.2d 619, 
623-24 n.10 (4th Cir. 1964); SuCHARITKUL, STATE IMMUNmES AND TRADING ACTIVITIES IN 
INTERNATIONAL I..AW 299-304 (1959). 
2. The doctrine of absolute immunity was first established in American law when 
immunity was granted to an armed vessel in the services of a friendly sovereign. The 
Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812). 
3. 336 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1964). 
4. Victory Transport Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abastecimientos y Transportes, 
232 F. Supp. 294 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). 
5. But cf. The Pesaro, 277 Fed. 473 (S.D.N.Y 1921), vacated sub nom. Berizzi Bros. 
Co. v. S.S. Pesaro, 13 F.2d 468 (S.D.N.Y.), afj'd, 271 U.S. 562 (1926); Harris &: Co. 
Advertising, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 127 So. 2d 687 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1961); 
Pacific Molasses Co. v. Comite De Ventas De Mieles, 219 N.Y.S.2d 1018 (Sup. Ct. 1961). 
6. 324 U.S. 30 (1945). 
7. See also United States v. Deutsches Kalisyndikat Gesellschaft, 31 F.2d 199 
(S.D.N.Y. 1929), where immunity was denied a wholly owned government corporation 
which was conducting a commercial business as a private entity. 
8. 324 U.S. at 35. 
9. 26 DEP'T STATE BULL. 984 (1952). See generally Bishop, New United States Policy 
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cision to suggest immunity only if the act of the sovereign was non-
commercial. In National City Bank v. Republic of China,10 the 
Supreme Court further restricted the doctrine of absolute immunity 
by allowing a permissive counterclaim against a sovereign plaintiff. 
In dicta, the Court declared that immunity was not absolute11 and 
indicated approval of the State Department's policy of restricted 
immunity.12 
The original justification for granting absolute immunity-fear 
that the exercise of authority by one sovereign over another would 
"vex the peace of nations" -passed with the era of personal sover-
eignty.13 Apprehension that judicially created limitations on im-
munity would embarrass the State Department has been the more 
recent explanation for the doctrine.14 This position seems doubtful, 
considering the State Department's policy pronouncement in the 
Tate Letter.15 It has also been argued that the United States position 
as a litigant abroad is strengthened by adherence to the absolute 
doctrine.16 Although this motive is legitimate, it is, in fact, not 
very significant since the United States has consistently declined to 
claim immunity for its own ships in foreign courts.17 
Similarly, the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity has been 
attacked by many as unworkable because of the difficulty in dis-
tinguishing private from public acts.18 Although one cannot deny 
the classification problems which will be encountered,19 the diffi-
culty in making a specific factual determination should not dictate 
Limiting Sovereign Immunity, 47 AM. J. INT'L L. 93 (1953); Comment, 60 MICH. L. REv. 
1142 (1962). 
10. 348 U.S. 356 (1955). 
11. Id. at 364. 
12. See id. at 361. 
13. See SUCHARITKUL, op. cit. supra note l, at 4-5; Comment, 63 YALE L.J. 1148, 
1169-70 (1954). 
14. See National City Bank v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356, 361 (1955); Republic 
of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 35 (1945). 
15. See Victory Transport Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abastecimientos y Trans-
portes, 336 F.2d 354, 358 (2d Cir. 1964). 
16. See Leonard, The United States as Litigant in Foreign Courts, in PROCEEDINGS OF 
AMERICAN Soc'y OF INTERNATIONAL L. 95 (1958), where this argument is advanced by a 
member of the Justice Department, its major proponent. 
17. See Flota Maritima Browning v. Motor Vessel Ciudad, 335 F.2d 619, 623-24 n.10 
(4th Cir. 1964); 2 HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 439 (1941); Brandon, 
Sovereign Immunity of Government-Owned Corporation and Ships, 39 CORNELL L.Q. 
425, 429 (1954). 
18. See, e.g., Brandon, The Case Against the Restrictive Theory of Sovereign Im-
munity, 21 INS. COUNSEL J. 11 passim (1954); cf. New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 
572, 583 (1946). 
19. The courts of countries that have previously adopted a theory of restrictive im-
munity have had a great deal of difficulty in making this classification. See the examples 
cited in SUCHARrtKUL, op. cit. supra note 1, at 320-25; SWEENEY, THE INTERNATIONAL 
LAW OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 26-44 (1963); Bishop, supra note 9, at 103-05. 
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rejection of a rule- of law founded on economic reality and faimess.20 
With states becoming active participants in sectors of the economy 
customarily considered private, it is evident that foreign trade will 
be deterred if absolute immunity of the foreign sovereign is con-
tinued.21 Moreover, by opening the judicial process to claims against 
foreign sovereigns, the restrictive theory will eliminate some present 
inequities toward the private trader.22 
In addition, both consistency with our domestic policy and 
international practice seem to call for an adoption of restrictive 
immunity.23 Absolute immunity appears particularly inappropriate 
in the United States, which has, in its domestic affairs, largely 
waived this immunity.24 Moreover, restrictive immunity has been 
adopted by a majority of foreign nations.25 In 1926, twenty nations 
signed the Brussels Convention, which limited sovereign immunity 
in maritime commerce to noncommercial transactions.26 Between 
1948 and 1958, the United States became a party to fourteen bilateral 
treaties that waived sovereign immunity for business activities.27 
This acceptance of restrictive sovereign immunity seems especially 
significant since treaty and custom are major sources of international 
law.28 
The implementation of the restrictive theory of sovereign im-
munity is, however, dependent upon the solution of certain proce-
dural problems presently confronting the private litigant. In addi-
tion to the problem of service of process in an in personam action,29 
accentuated because it is a federal statutory crime to serve process 
20. See Timberg, Sovereign Immunity, State Trading, Socialism and Self Decep-
tion, 56 Nw. U.L. REv. 109, 125-26 (1961). 
21. Fensterwald, United States Policies Toward State Trading, 24 I.Aw &: CONTEMP. 
PROB. 369, 396 (1959). 
22. See Fensterwald, supra note 21, at 396; Timberg, supra note 20, at 109-10. 
23. See REsrATEMENT, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw, Explanatory Note § 72, at 232 (Pro• 
posed Draft, 1962). 
24. See, e.g., Court of Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1958); Federal Tort Claims Act, 
28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2674 (1958); Suits in Admiralty Act § 2, 41 Stat. 525 (1920), 46 U.S.C. 
§ 742 (Supp. V, 1964); Public Vessels Liability Act § I, 43 Stat. 1112 (1925), 46 U.S.C. 
§ 781 (1958). See generally Reeves, Good Fences and Good Neighbors: Restraints on 
Immunity of Sovereigns, 44 A.B.A.J. 521, 523 (1958); Timberg, supra note 20, at 126. 
25. See SucHARITKUL, op. cit. supra note I, at 162-256; Timberg, supra note 20, 
at 118. 
26. International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Concerning the 
Immunities of Government Vessels Concluded at Brussels on April 10, 1926, reprinted 
in ALLEN, THE POSITION OF FOREIGN STATES BEFORE NATIONAL COURTS 303-08 (1933). See 
generally SUCHARITKUL, op. cit. supra note I, at 92-100. 
27. E.g., Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation with Italy, Feb. 2, 1948, 
art. 24, para. 6, 63 Stat. 2292, T .I.A.S. No. 1965. See generally Setser, .The Immunity 
Waiver for State-Controlled Business Enterprises in United States Commercial Treaties, 
in PROCEEDINGS OF AMERICAN Soc'y OF INTERNATIONAL L. 89 (1961). 
28. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900); STAT. lNT'L CT. JUST. art. 38. 
29. See generally Drachsler, Some Observations on the Current Status of the Tate 
Letter, 54 AM. J. lNT'L L. 790 (1960); Comment, 60 MICH. L. REv. 1142, 1148 (1962). 
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on the ambassador of a foreign nation,30 the problems of attachment 
in aid of obtaining jurisdiction31 and of execution on property of 
the foreign sovereign32 have not clearly been settled. Whereas the 
question of service of process on an ambassador in an action arising 
out of commercial activities is presently being litigated,33 the court 
in Victory Transport proposed a different solution by equating a 
commercial branch of a foreign government with a foreign cor-
poration, thereby permitting service of process by registered mail 
under "single act" or "doing business" long-arm statutes, which 
are available in many states.34 Although it seems that American 
courts would recognize a waiver by contract of these procedural 
restrictions,35 in general these problems will have to be solved if 
restrictive immunity is to be meaningful. 
It appears that the adoption of restrictive immunity has been 
impeded by the fear of the judiciary that such a doctrine would 
require a political decision, in violation of the constitutional re-
quirement of separation of powers.36 Although the Constitution 
does require the judiciary's dependence on the executive for a 
determination of those sovereigns entitled to claim immunity,37 the 
making of factual determinations of whether acts are commercial is 
essentially a judicial function, only practicable on a case by case 
basis.38 For example, in Victory Transport the grain was purchased 
for resale to Spanish nationals, private channels of trade were ex-
30. REv. STAT. §§ 4063, 4064 (1875), 22 U.S.C. §§ 252-53 (1958). 
31. In New York &: Cuba Mail S.S. Co. v. Republic of Korea, 132 F. Supp. 684 
(S.D.N.Y. 1955), the court held that the Tate Letter had no effect on the customary 
rule that the property of a foreign sovereign is free from attachment. See also Loomis 
v. Rogers, 254 F.2d 941 (D.C. Cir. 1958). The State Department, however, now appears 
to recognize specifically attachment in aid of jurisdiction. See Letter from Loftus 
Becker, Legal Advisor to the State Department, to Attorney General William Rogers, 
June 22, 1959, quoted in Stephen v. Zivnostenska Banka, 15 App. Div. 2d 111, 116, 222 
N.Y.S.2d 128, 134 (1961). 
32. Sec Dexter&: Carpenter v. Kunglig Jamvagsstyrelsen, 43 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1930) 
(execution not permitted); Brandon, supra note 17, at 429. But see Lamont v. Travelers 
Ins. Co., 281 N.Y. 362, 24 N.E.2d 81 (1939). Several continental European countries have 
allowed attachment of a foreign sovereign's property to execute a judgment. See 
Sacobelge et Etat beige v. Etat hellenique, 79 JOURNAL Du DRorr INTERNATIONAL 244 
(1952). 
33. The order of the district court for the District of Columbia in Hellenic Lines 
Ltd. v. Moore not permitting the service is unreported. See generally Griffin, Adjective 
Law and Practice in Suits Against Foreign Governments, 36 TEMP. L.Q. 1, 11-14 (1962). 
34. Victory Transport Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abastecimientos y Transportes, 
336 F.2d 354, 363 (2d Cir. 1964). 
35. See id. at 364; Farr &: Co. v. Cia Intercontinental De Navegacion, 243 F.2d 342 
(2d Cir. 1957). 
36. See Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 35 (1945). 
37. See id. at 34-36; cf. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964); 
National City Bank v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356, 357 (1955); Guaranty Trust Co. 
v. United States, 304 U.S. 126, 137-38 (1938). 
38. See SucHAIUTKUL, op. cit. supra note 1, at 281-83. But see Drachsler, Some Ob-
servations on the Current Status of the Tate Letter, 54 AM. J. INT'L L. 790, 799 n.27 
(1960). 
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elusively employed, and an arbitration clause acknowledged the 
commercial nature of the charter party.39 As similar activities have 
been held commercial in those countries that have adopted the 
restrictive theory,40 the court easily made the factual determination 
that a commercial activity was involved. The court, however, went 
beyond the immediate factual situation to enumerate categories of 
state activities that it considered to be public, rather than com-
mercial, in nature and entitled to immunity.41 This is an apparent 
attempt to establish guidelines for the solution of the difficult· 
classification problems which have faced the courts of nations that 
have previously adopted the doctrine of restrictive immunity.42 
Even so, the Court indicated that should the State Department 
subsequently define "commercial activity," it would abide by that 
definition. 43 
It is strongly arguable that combining restrictive immunity with 
deference to a State Department determination in a particular case 
is unwise except in the very limited situation in which an incident 
is particularly crucial to foreign relations.44 One of the significant 
factors leading to the adoption of restrictive immunity was the 
desire to provide the private litigant with a "day in court."45 It was 
felt that once the judiciary has made a factual determination that 
the controversy is of a commercial nature,46 the plaintiff should be 
able to maintain his suit.47 Combining the restrictive theory of 
immunity with judicial deference to the State Department, whose 
39. 336 F.2d at 356 n.2. 
40. See SUCHARITKUL, op. cit. supra note 1, at 322-25. 
41. 336 F.2d at 360, where the enumeration is as follows: (1) Internal administrative 
acts, such as expulsion of an alien; (2) Legislative acts, such as nationalization; (3) Acts 
concerning the armed forces; (4) Acts concerning diplomatic activity; (5) Public loans. 
42. See note 19 supra. 
43. 336 F.2d at 360. 
44. See Rich v. Naviera Vacuba S.A., 295 F.2d 24 (4th Cir. 1961), where the court 
followed the suggestion of the State Department and released a ship which was owned 
by the Cuban government and had been attached by United States citizens. This took 
place during the "Cuban crisis," shortly following a release by the Cuban government 
of an airplane owned by a United States citizen. 
45. 336 F.2d at 358. See Cardozo, Sovereign Immunity: The Plaintiff Deserves a 
Day in Court, 67 HARV. L. REv. 608 (1954). 
46. See generally Cardozo, Judicial Deference to State Department Suggestions: 
Recognition of Prerogative or Abdication to Usurper?, 48 CORNELL L.Q. 461, 474 (1963). 
But see Timberg, supra note 20, at 128. 
47. Of course, unless the State Department first determines that the defendant is a 
true sovereign, no immunity will be granted. Once true sovereignty is determined, im• 
-munity may also attach to subdivisions or agents of the sovereign. Sullivan v. State of 
Sao Paulo, 122 F.2d 355 (2d Cir. 1941); lsbrandtsen Co. v. Netherlands E. Indies 
Gov't, 75 F. Supp. 48 (S.D.N.Y. 1947) (immunity granted upon a showing that de-
fendant government was "part of" the Netherlands government). Cf. Comment, The 
Act of State Doctrine after Sabbatino, 63 MICH. L. REv. 528 (1965). But cf. Wulfsohn v. 
Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic, 234 N.Y. 372, 138 N.E. 24 (1923), where 
an unrecognized government was granted the act of state privilege. 
Recent Developments
proceedings are ex parte and lack certain legal safeguards, 4 militates
against this goal. Legal scholars have long criticized broad judicial
deference to the State Department,4 9 but it is even less defensible
with the adoption of the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity.
48. Timberg, supra note 20, at 122-24.
49. See Deak, The Plea of Sovereign Immunity and the New York Court of Appeals,
40 COLUM. L. REv. 453, 462-63 (1940); Jessup, Has the Supreme Court Abdicated One
of Its Functions?, 40 AM. J. INT'L L. 168; Timberg, supra note 20, at 128.
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